The events in Ukraine make it clear to us that even in the present day, a once peaceful coexistence can end in a devastating war. Because even after thousands of wars, humanity has only managed to live together peacefully to a limited extent - there are conflicts and unrest in many parts of the world. But why is this so? Why do populations in a supposedly enlightened world still resort to weapons? And how can displeasure over disagreements be prevented from ending in violence? Peace and conflict researcher Prof. Alexander Spencer examines just that in his research. In the new edition of "Know When You Want", he talks about the success of peace alliances, how language creates images of the enemy, the role the media plays in this, and that peace always requires compromise on both sides

Today’s Guest

Prof. Alexander Spencer holds the Chair of International Relations at the Faculty of Human Sciences at the University of Magdeburg and is the head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Master's program. After studying politics and international relations, he specialized in terrorism and conflict research and analyzes, among other things, the importance of language and narratives in the development of conflicts.

 *the audio file is only available in German
 

The podcast to read

Intro voice: "Wissen, wann du wilst." The podcast about research at the University of Magdeburg.

Ina Götze: The introduction to this podcast is actually particularly difficult for me this time, because today it's about the depressing events in Ukraine. You might think that people actually get along after thousands of wars. But unfortunately they don't. There are conflicts and wars all over the world, like the current one between Ukraine and Russia. Professor Alexander Spencer is researching how these arise and what political solutions there are. Today he is our guest and talks to us about his research and of course the current situation in Ukraine. A warm welcome!

Prof. Spencer: Thank you very much!

Ina Götze: Before we start, our podcast is of course no substitute for current news coverage, nor should it be, because the situation is developing at a dynamic pace. Today, we want to try to understand why there are wars in the first place and how peace can prevail. For transparency, since we are of course also referring to current events, we are recording this podcast on March 9 at 1 pm. In my introduction, I deliberately referred to "the situation in Ukraine," because right now there are quite a few terms for what's happening there: Conflict, war, war of aggression, invasion. Which of these is really correct?

Prof. Spencer: I think you can already talk about war in that sense. Ultimately, a definition of war is always a bit difficult, of course, but I think there are three elements that are central to war. First, it has to be about something political. So politics is central to war. The second is that it has to be over a certain period of time. There is such an element where one says war is actually the period of time in which we agree that we can behave with violence. The third thing, beyond that period of time is just combat. Of course, there is also no definition of "this has to be over 25 days," but it is a time frame. We also need a certain intensity. There are different definitions there. One of the definitions from a fairly old project, that's called "The Correlance of War Project" from the '60s, that tried to find different explanations for variables for the onset of war. They define war as a thousand battle deaths per year. And, of course, that number is taken pretty arbitrarily. But I think the basic idea behind it is, of course, that you need a certain intensity, whether it's a thousand or whether it's eight hundred is then not so central, but that I think we have to talk about intensity already in order to legitimately talk about a war. I think that in this case, it is quite appropriate to speak of a war.

Ina Götze: Often, external protagonists intervene in these conflicts and wars between two countries, try to mediate or support one side, as is currently the case. How helpful is that? Do we need this support to prevent things from getting worse? Or does it perhaps simply make things worse?

Prof. Spencer: It always depends on what you mean by support. What kind of support is being addressed here? Ultimately, it is also always questionable on the other side what we rate as success. Of course, what may be considered a success in the short term may somehow also be a failure and a mistake in the long term, and then even longer into the future it may have been a good idea again. And that varies over time. So it is very, very difficult to say whether such interventions will be crowned with success or not. It also depends on what you call an intervention. Of course, military intervention is, I think, the most blatant example, which in the case of Ukraine, of course, could have very, very fast, very big negative consequences. And that is, I think, also something where many people agree that military intervention on the part of NATO in Ukraine would not be a good idea, because it would potentially lead to further escalation or would pretty much certainly lead to further escalation. And then we might be looking at World War III. Nobody here wants that.

Ina Götze: So that would be a measure that would definitely not be helpful and would make the whole thing worse. What NATO is doing and what the EU is doing, they are taking economic sanctions. That is one of the means they can use. And many companies are also more or less joining in right now. Are such measures successful? So is such pressure enough to influence a ruler or perhaps also his population to rebel against him?

Prof. Spencer: Ultimately, sanctions alone, I believe, will not lead to success. However, what sanctions ultimately do, they increase the cost of such a conflict - for Putin, in that case. So that's something where ultimately pressure is also built up, also against the local population, that is, in Russia. And the possibility to put pressure on Putin as well. Will that then lead to a reconsideration? I doubt it, at least not in the short term, but it is certainly a possibility to increase the costs that Putin has to pay for this war in Ukraine.

Ina Götze: That the war may not last quite as long then, or cannot last very long, right?

Prof. Spencer: Exactly, so a lot more resources have to be invested, so not only military material, but the war, after all, has other costs on the Russian economy. And these are all ways to increase these costs.

Ina Götze: Now there are very different scenarios as to how the war could end. One is that Russia will unfortunately take Ukraine completely. How will he manage to occupy the country? After all, the Ukrainians will still be against him, will not accept them. Will there be years of fighting then?

Prof. Spencer: I think it is simply not possible to control a country of the size with the population with the troops that Russia has at its disposal. It will not work. Accordingly, I don't think it's Putin's goal either. I think if it is, it would be another bigger mistake than the mistakes that have already happened now. But I don't think occupying will be an option.

Ina Götze: I find that interesting and almost makes me a bit optimistic. Is that appropriate now or would that be naive?

Prof. Spencer: Well, in the end, a lot can still go wrong. It's not like that, and let's be honest, no one can see inside Putin's head-what Putin is up to. In the end, we are speculating. However, the mere fact that the troop numbers that are on the ground will not be enough to fully occupy the country. Will not work, especially in a situation where the population is very hostile to Russian troops.

Ina Götze: And fights back. However, Ukrainians and Russians are actually very close to each other; many have relatives, acquaintances and friends in the other country. How does a ruler manage to turn them against each other? So, that Russian soldiers shoot at their Ukrainian friends under certain circumstances.

Prof. Spencer: This has a lot to do with years of indoctrination by Russian state media, which keeps telling a certain narrative. We have seen this in other interventions and other wars, for example Georgia. That it is emphasized that Russian citizens are threatened, that there is genocide in the other country, that one must therefore intervene to protect these citizens.

Ina Götze: This seems to be such a perennial issue.

Prof. Spencer: Exactly, that is the standard narrative that is used again and again and is also very strongly emphasized. But we must not forget either: The Russian population is not stupid. In the sense that there is a large part of the population that does not necessarily believe state television. There are also parts of the population that are very much influenced by it, but especially the younger generation, which somehow uses social media to inform and exchange information. You can see it, too. There are definitely protests by the local population in Russia and also arrests. They are very aware of what they are doing and the risks they are taking, but they do it anyway. That doesn't mean that they will overthrow Putin. But there are definitely first signs of that. There are also family members of Russian soldiers who are complaining loudly to their governors and local politicians about why their children are being sent there and what the point is. There is definitely criticism, but in the end, they always try to keep it down, to suppress it. And I think that only works for so long, especially when the narrative that is being told seems to be less and less in line with reality. So you notice that the casualty figures of the Russian troops are getting bigger and bigger. Then it just becomes difficult to somehow maintain this narrative of the successful military operation, as it is called. I think, overall, what we see here is a conflict of different narratives. On the one hand, Putin, who is still very much focused on more traditional media, like television. And on the other hand, Selenskyj, who works very strongly with social media. And you also notice that he is an actor, because he knows how media works and how he can tell a good story. So also a story about the people, which grips them emotionally, sweeps them along. So it's more this romantic "the civilian soldier who actually attacks a state that is unjust, much stronger, Russia." And you also see how, for example, the images are used, which are used by Ukrainian authorities and especially a president and then also this quote Russian Warship: Go fuck yourself. Am I allowed to say that? I don't know.

Ina Götze: We are not beeping anything out here now. (laughs)

Prof. Spencer: And that alone, that narrative, that underdog standing up to the bully. They are very good at presenting that. In contrast, Putin's monologues on television, seem like they're out of time. They seem... partly the narrative, which is built up by a neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine, which is also addicted to drugs. Where you think to yourself: Phew, that's kind of a tall tale, where I think to myself whether it really catches the imagination that well.

Ina Götze: (laughs) Even Hollywood can't come up with that.

Prof. Spencer: Of course, with a part of the population, this will certainly still work, but in others... I think it's just a step too far. There are also different theories about what makes a good story. And I think that somehow Selenskyj has it much better than this self-promotion or the presentation of why the fight on the side of Ukraine is justified.

Ina Götze: That day, I actually read a great comment on Instagram, or rather a tweet. A former actor who is now president and in principle defends his country with his hands. Then Anonymous, who in principle interferes with it, then Putin. The enumeration of these actors that are coming together right now, and even Hollywood wouldn't have thought of that.... nobody would have thought of actually writing this script. And that's what's happening right now. It's actually crazy, you have to say. Now, for me, it's a bit of a classic stalemate. The Ukrainians understandably don't want to give up their country. But Putin can't really take a step back without losing face. It does give us a little hope that Ukraine is now seeking new negotiations and saying: Okay, we would then forego joining NATO, among other things. Is there perhaps a diplomatic solution after all, or what could the path to peace there look like?

Prof. Spencer: The big problem is that Putin has ultimately put himself in a situation, as you said, that he almost can't get out of on his own. Military occupation of Ukraine is virtually impossible, at least with the troop numbers they have. Then simply the withdrawal of Russian troops. No, he won't do that either, because that would hurt him a lot domestically. With his reputation as a strong man. Gender also plays a very, very important role, that is, gender representations. That's why it's very, very difficult to think about this in any way: What options are there? Ultimately, it will come down to Ukraine and, for example, some of the demands that Putin is also making, namely the withdrawal of the NATO countries from Eastern Europe.

For example, the Baltic states, NATO leaving Poland... So exactly the countries see now: It's good that we are in NATO. We see that these fears of threat, which existed, are quite justified. I always find that very, very interesting. We see this classic security dilemma, which is repeatedly emphasized here in some theories. Where one side feels threatened, takes a certain action, for example, joining an alliance, the other side interprets this as a threat, rearms itself somehow, and then this situation builds up and can potentially escalate.

Ina Götze: The irony, I was about to say, is that Putin, in principle, feels threatened by NATO. But the one who is really threatening is somehow him. At least right now in our eyes. You can't look into the future and say: Maybe NATO wouldn't have launched something against him at some point, we don't know. It's certainly more unlikely than what he's doing right now, but....

Prof. Spencer: Again, you have to look at, NATO would not even have the capacity to invade Russia.... The threat that Putin sees from NATO is not the threat to the Russian state from invasion or anything, but rather the threat or loss of influence in the sphere around Russia. I think that is more what he sees as being threatened. Not so much I think the integrity of Russia. That's where nuclear weapons as a deterrent ultimately play a key role again. Nobody is thinking about NATO troops being able to invade Russia, that is not a scenario that is on the table.

Ina Götze: Fortunately! Through globalization, more and more countries... Well, not now, but in principle, more and more countries are joining forces, because it also brings them economic advantages to work together. Is globalization perhaps thus a small guarantee of peace, or rather the dependence that results from it?

Prof. Spencer: People had always thought that would be so great. And that was always one of the arguments in favor of North Stream 2, that of course mutual trade creates mutual dependencies. Germany is dependent on Russian gas, but Russia is also dependent on financial resources from Germany. But apparently this theoretical approach is not very helpful in this case. I think it has something to do with the structure of the political system in Russia. Normally, the basic argumentation that through economic relations, so you have your headquarters in other countries, you exchange, people go to the local branches and there are exchanges between Russian and German people. And through that, you get to know each other, you get to trust each other. Maybe you even like each other, go for a beer. On a personal level, it works very well that you realize: Okay, we have the same interests. That's why it's much more difficult to create images of the enemy, because you know that he's not at all like the one described here from personal experience. But then, when we are in a system.... if it happens in a system where these individuals no longer have much influence on politics, then it is possible again. Democratically, it definitely becomes much more difficult to do that because the person can vote and say, nope, nope, but that's not true at all. They have a possibility to contradict. But in a dictatorship, and I'll just call it that, that's not possible. And that makes it much less possible to influence the behavior of the state. And in Russia, you can see again that the structure of the state is very, very important to explain behavior. So in a country where the opposition has no power, or there is almost no opposition anymore, it is ultimately much more difficult, these checks and balances that exist, that they can also take effect, that they can prevent certain things from being done. Whereas in democracies, there is a clear process. The disadvantage of democracies is that they are very slow, but at the same time, they have the advantage because this slowness also creates certain trust in democracies. We know France can't invade Germany, because of course that's for different identity reasons, but at the same time, it's just bureaucratically not feasible at all, not that fast. And that's why this structure that exists is also quite helpful to understand why states behave the way they do, and precisely in the case of Putin, where it's really very, very centrally concentrated around him, individual decisions by individual people are then very, very crucial.

Ina Götze: The Western countries are showing themselves to be very united in their behavior right now. And now Georgia and Moldova would also like to join the EU. Is the EU a model for peaceful coexistence and could this spirit perhaps spread? So that's what Putin is probably afraid of, too, but can it spill over?

Prof. Spencer: The EU is not flawless now. So I think we argue enough in the EU already. And I don't think that's necessarily the point of the EU. One sense of the EU is that these disputes don't turn violent, and I think that's also the sense of institutions as a whole at the international level. One sense is that they are channels of communication. They are opportunities to talk to each other, even in very, very different areas, in order to address potential problems in a timely manner, to discuss them and to consider how to deal with them. And ultimately, this is an essential part of what the EU does. It's a network of communication channels. Of course, that doesn't help that there is no conflict. But it does help to ensure that this conflict does not ultimately turn violent, because there are other mechanisms for resolving conflicts. Then you just get sued, for example. So there are institutional ways to resolve conflicts. And that, I believe, is an essential point that can explain a bit why the EU can and should be understood as a peace project.

Ina Götze: Now Putin, we have already hinted at it earlier, or we have already said has made many demands in order to end the war. What exactly can be implemented now, in what form, and what can be promised to him, only the future will show? Does peace come from the fact that we unfortunately have to compromise with such tyrannical people?

Prof. Spencer: I believe that peace always involves compromise. It's the same in the EU. We also see that it is not only Germany's interests that can prevail, but that there is always a bit of give-and-take, a kind of compromise. And that is, I think, as unjust and as frustrating as it may seem, to compromise with parties who do unjust things, who threaten violence or even use violence, it is, I think, one of the few possibilities in this situation to still somehow or to lead to less violence.

The question is, where are the opportunities for compromise? I also think many of Putin's demands are purely rhetorical. They are not really serious in the sense that Putin knows very well that this will never happen. So, for example, the withdrawal of NATO, from the Baltic states, from Poland, and others. That's not really going to happen. The other thing that is still a possibility is the neutrality of Ukraine, that is, that Ukraine does not join NATO. Of course, that was hinted at, that Ukraine can join NATO, but it was never concrete. It never was: Ukraine will be part of NATO tomorrow. That was not the case. I think there is room for maneuver there. But that is a decision that Ukraine and its Ukrainian government have to make. There's not really much the West can do about that.... That's not the West's decision, that's something that Ukraine has to, has to decide.

Ina Götze: One consequence for Germany is to rearm. Now, disarmament has been used for decades as a sign of peace and that it is not necessary. Will it possibly lead to more military conflicts again?

Prof. Spencer: There are two different approaches. One would say that military armament leads to the fact that we deter each other. That greater military power raises the price of a conflict, so that people think twice about whether it's worth it. On the other hand, of course, military armament is always a danger of escalation. It is precisely this spiral, this arms race, which we already saw during the Cold War, that continues to escalate, and with more military material and more, to put it quite banally, more aircraft in the air, mistakes can always be made and there can always be unintended consequences as a result of mistakes made by individuals. That makes it a bit of a double-edged sword.

Ina Götze: We hope that it will actually only serve as a deterrent. (laughs) With us, however, I am also very optimistic.

Prof. Spencer: Here, too, the question is: Would the German army really be a deterrent, or is it not others, for example NATO membership, that is a deterrent or not? Of course, that's always a bit controversial. Or isn't it also nuclear weapons that would deter? It is highly problematic, very, very controversial to discuss. And again and again, it has also been emphasized, for example, in neorealist theories that say that these nuclear weapons are peace-makers because they ultimately lead to mutual deterrence. At the same time, there is definitely the possibility of mistakes, and if those mistakes then produce catastrophic results as outcomes, of course, it's not really a good idea either. But that's kind of the conflict that exists. These arguments for and against nuclear weapons and of course in an ideal world where there would be no nuclear weapons, that's so the goal. But in the current situation, we always have the problem, if one side has nuclear weapons, how can you convince the other side to give them up? Or how can trust be built in mutual disarmament? This is attempted through treaties, for example, by stipulating certain measures and agreeing that certain weapons will be abolished or greatly reduced, and so on. But even there, there is always the possibility of leaving these agreements.

Ina Götze: It's a bit like the Wild West. You're facing each other and somehow both have to put the gun down at the same time so that the other person is confident that there won't be any shooting. The first conflict occurs in the schoolyard. (laughs) So even children argue, fight. Why is that? Why can't humanity just get along?

Prof. Spencer: There are different theories about what ultimately leads to conflict, that is, at the international level. And maybe it helps a little bit for kindergarten. And these are ultimately, I would say three, four, five different approaches. One would say it's about power. That conflicts arise because we want to gain certain power or defend positions of power can also be seen in kindergarten. At the same time, others would say: Well, it actually has more to do with the presence or absence of institutions. So the EU example, with less institutional interdependence, it is easier for conflicts or war to occur, because there are fewer opportunities for communication, for finding compromises, and so on. That would be a second approach. A third approach would be: Well, a lot is connected with the economic interests of certain social groups within the state. And others would then emphasize again: Well, no no, it's actually about values and norms, i.e. which identities exist, what is considered right, i.e. a normative attitude, and then ultimately also approaches that are very strongly focused on the attribution of identities and concepts of the enemy to oneself and to others. In other words, discourses construct certain identities, Russia as the enemy or the West as the enemy, or certain characteristic features are ascribed that make war or violence possible in the first place, for example by dehumanizing certain protagonists. And this makes it much easier to use violence if certain characteristics are denied to them, for example: drug-addicted neo-Nazis. So as an example of how it is tried to delegitimize people. So these different theoretical explanations can be used to examine conflicts in order to see to what extent they help us to understand the conflict in this case.

Ina Götze: And have the reasons why conflicts arise or why there are also wars changed in the course of history? Or do people actually still fight for the same reasons?

Prof. Spencer: Yes, so as I said, I really think those are the main reasons I mentioned. So let's break it down again: Power interests and identities. These are the three core elements that come up again and again when we look at conflicts.

Ina Götze: So humanity will not overcome it, so at least in the identities to say: I don't really care what is in other countries and how they identify themselves, as long as it just works in my own country.

Prof. Spencer: Yes, there is always the problem that the world is not so closed off. That means there are so many connections to other countries. That's why it's always very, very difficult to argue: Well, we do it this way here and you do it differently over there, that's okay. It's very difficult because there are so many connections through trade, through communication, because we travel so much more.

Ina Götze: It’s a mixture of everything.

Prof. Spencer: Exactly.

Ina Götze: But change is also a good thing. Perhaps we should also tell Mr. Putin this. It's okay that something changes after 40 years. People always say that funeral homes will unfortunately always have something to do, because unfortunately people always die. That's a little bit true for your research, too, because unfortunately there will probably always be wars. Does that worry you?

Prof. Spencer: I think it would be nice if I were unemployed at some point. Maybe after retirement then, then it's okay. I think that there will always be conflicts. And peace and conflict research is not only concerned with violent conflicts, i.e. with physical, violent conflicts, but also with other conflicts that also involve aspects of structural violence, such as racism. Although physical violence is not always the first option, but rather the problem is of a structural nature. And I think that's another aspect that we're interested in exploring. So I would agree with you that I don't think it's foreseeable now that we will somehow all live in peace. Of course, we always have to discuss our understanding of peace a little bit: What do we actually understand by peace? And there are two different, very rough understandings. One that emphasizes the concept of negative peace. And negative peace here simply means the absence of violence. So we're not killing each other, but all the other things, like structural violence, racism, sexism, those would still be there. Positive peace, on the other hand, is rather this idea of a harmonious coexistence, which then also contains this utopian a bit, where we will perhaps never get there, but is always somehow a beautiful ideal as a goal. And I think, at least for me, it makes the most sense to understand peace as a kind of spectrum. Not so much as a final state. Peace and the idea of good is simply something that also changes again and again.

Ina Götze: And do you believe that at least negative peace would be possible worldwide? That there would at least be no violence?

Prof. Spencer: It doesn't look so good now. But I think we can see that conflicts, that is, that at some point violence ends. So no conflict is infinitely long. At some point, conflicts end. I think it's always a bit reassuring to know that war always ends at some point. That will continue to be the case. Whether it will be the case globally that violence will be outlawed in this way, I doubt in the near future.

Ina Götze: How did you personally choose your field of research? So why peace and conflict research? Why not business studies, I don't know, quantum physics, why peace and conflict research?

Prof. Spencer: I've always been ultimately interested in this absurdity of war. In the sense that we almost always agree that war is actually a bad thing, but nevertheless it happens. And precisely this question: why does it actually still happen? And how can we explain it and understand it? And then also, what does that mean for politics and how can we make it happen less often? So to lower the expectations a little bit, that's something I'm always very interested in. I also started with terrorism research and that has to do with the fact that I did Erasmus in Spain in the 90s and one of my professors was killed by ETA.

That moved me very much and then also the question: Why does this happen? Why is this happening in a democracy? When Franco was still ... I could somehow plausibilize why this was happening. In democracy, I found it very difficult and then I was very interested in examining why terrorism happens and why it leads to other conflicts.

Ina Götze: If you want to follow in his footsteps, you can study peace and conflict studies with us. What do students learn?

Prof. Spencer: They learn to analyze and examine conflicts from different theoretical perspectives. These theories or understandings help us to understand this conflict and then to consider possible solutions. What options are there for dealing with conflicts? What roles do mediations play, for example? We analyze very specific conflicts to see what exactly is happening? What are the causes? And the most important thing is to adopt perspectives. Trying to put on a new pair of glasses and to see the conflict through these glasses and to leave out one's own opinion in order to see to what extent I can change these glasses. We do that very, very often, that people have to take perspectives and, for example, defend a certain argument, even if they perhaps don't believe in it themselves, in order to see what it's like when we put on these glasses. And just critical thinking, reflection. It is, I think, something that is very, very central. So about, for example, normal media coverage: what does it mean when it's described like that? Also the role of language, for example. So overall, I would say that our research direction, it goes more into this critical research, which is very much interested in the discursive construction of aspects, enemy images, construction, in order to see what role, language and discourses, narratives play for the construction of protagonists and then also what consequences that has for our confrontation and dealings with each other.

Ina Götze: You have to be extremely open, but I imagine that's very helpful. We're actually coming to the end of this podcast, to a final, perhaps more private question. I actually imagine that you are a very, very peace-loving person. How do you personally deal with conflict?

Prof. Spencer: I do not know if I am so peaceful, you would have to ask my children and my family. I think talking, communication! Addressing things as soon as something bothers you or something is strange. Communication is the central aspect with which you.... You can talk about a lot of things, you can intercept a lot of things first. Whether you then agree is another question. But I think communication is the first good step.

Ina Götze: That sounds good. Many, many thanks for being here. I would have preferred to interview you on a more peaceful topic, of course, I must confess, but it was still very, very educational and had a touch of optimism, is something I'm taking away from the podcast now.

Prof. Spencer: That’s nice to hear.

Ina Götze: I hope you out there by the speakers or on your headphones too and stay healthy, stay optimistic and tune in again next time. Thank you very much!

Prof. Spencer: Thank you very much!

Intro voice: "Wissen, wann du wilst." The podcast about research at the University of Magdeburg.